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3/AA/098965-B2

SIGINT ALERT MARGAY

ARGENTINE

Spanish

K25X/NM1987/30/05/82

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FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE: COMMANDER FALKLANDS GROUP LAMENTS THE
INFERIORITY OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES

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FROM: COMMANDER FALKLANDS GROUP
TO: COMMANDER SOUTHERN AIR FORCE
INFO: COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE
COMMANDER STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

INTERNAL DTG: 2905821500

NO: ZVS 133/FC

PART I OF VI PARTS

I REPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN THE FALKLANDS THEATRE:

LAND SITUATION:

IN THE OPERATION ON DARWIN THE ENEMY DEMONSTRATED GREAT MOBILITY THROUGH ((THE USE OF)) HELICOPTERS, OVERWHELMING LAND FIRE POWER AND ANTI-AIR ((FIRE POWER)) THROUGH THE USE OF PORTABLE MISSILES, AS WELL AS EXCELLENT TRAINING AND OUTFITTING FOR NIGHT COMBAT, ACTING IN EXACT COORDINATION WITH SUPPORTING NAVAL FIRE, EMPLOYING IT AS BACK-UP AND RELIEF FOR THE TROOPS ENGAGED IN THE FRONT LINE.

PART II OF VI PARTS

OUR OWN FORCE OFFERED STRENUOUS RESISTANCE BUT PROBLEMS IN THE CONDUCT AND CONTROL OF OUR OWN TROOPS BECAME OBVIOUS. LACKING IN ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS AND SUFFICIENT TRAINING, THEY FELL INTO CONFUSION AND WERE UNABLE TO DERIVE ((ANY)) ADVANTAGE FROM THE PUCARA'S SUPPORTING FIRE WHICH FORCED TO THE ENEMY TO YIELD POSITIONS TEMPORARILY. THE SUPERIOR TRAINING AND OUTFITTING OF ENEMY TROOPS, THE GREAT CAPACITY OF THE HELICOPTERS FOR NIGHT-TIME MOBILITY AND NAVAL ARTILLERY SUPPORT, BECAME DECISIVE((I)) FACTORS DURING THE BATTLE AND REPRESENT THE MOST IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES WITH OUR OWN TROOPS' CAPABILITIES.

PART III OF VI PARTS

THE CONDUCT OF THE LAND ELEMENT, WITH AN ERRONEOUS CONCEPTION OF THE USE OF AIR EQUIPMENT, OVERESTIMATES THE LATTER'S CAPABILITIES AND RELIES EXCLUSIVELY ON THEM FOR THE ANNIHILATION OF THE ENEMY, WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE REDUCED PROFITABILITY OF DIRECT FIRE

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SUPPORT, WHICH BECOMES UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE OF THE LOSSES SUFFERED WHEN IT IS CARRIED OUT.

AIR SITUATION:

THE ENEMY HAS ABSOLUTE AIR SUPERIORITY AND HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED ITS QUANTITY OF PLANES. AT THE SAME TIME THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT IN SAN CARLOS THEY WERE ((B% PREPARING))((II)) HARRIER PLANES WHICH WOULD THEN INCREASE THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER'S COMPLEMENT. APART FROM AIR DEFENCE THEY ARE CARRYING OUT CONSTANT HARASSMENT AND ATTACKS ON OUR POSITIONS, HAVING ACHIEVED THE DESTRUCTION OF AN IMPORTANT NUMBER OF PUCARA PLANES AND HELICOPTERS AND THEREFORE NULLIFIED OUR CAPACITY FOR SIGNIFICANT HELICOPTER TRANSPORT OPERATIONS.

PART IV OF VI PARTS

THE PROFITABILITY OF DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT GROWS LESS EVERY DAY, GIVEN THAT TO THE FRAILTY AND INEPTITUDE OF THE PUCARA PLANE FOR THIS THEATRE IS ADDED THE GREAT DENSITY OF ANTI-AIR WEAPONS, ESPECIALLY THE PORTABLE MISSILES POSSESSED BY THE ENEMY, A CONSIDERATION EQUALLY VALID FOR THOSE OPERATIONS WITH PLANES FROM THE MAINLAND. THE TREMENDOUS EFFORT MADE BY THE AIR FORCE IN DESTROYING NAVAL UNITS HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN AFFECTING THE AIR SUPREMACY POSSESSED BY THE ENEMY WHICH ALLOWS HIM TO DEVELOP AIR AND HELICOPTER TRANSPORT OPERATIONS WITH ABSOLUTE FREEDOM OF ACTION.

NAVAL SITUATION:

THE ENEMY HAS BEEN GRANTED ABSOLUTE CONTROL OF THE SEA, WHICH PERMITS HIM TO REINFORCE AND SUPPLY THE BEACHHEAD DURING THE NIGHT, CARRY OUT NAVAL FIRE TO SOFTEN UP OUR POSITIONS OR SUPPORT LAND MANOEUVRES BY ITS OWN TROOPS, IMPLEMENT THE EFFECTIVE NAVAL BLOCKADE OF THIS HARBOUR, DESTROY WITHOUT OPPOSITION THE MERCHANT VESSELS STILL ASSIGNED, AND HAVE AVAILABLE AN EFFICIENT SYSTEM OF AIR-TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL WHICH PUTS OUR PLANES IN A SERIOUSLY INFERIOR POSITION.

PART V OF VI PARTS

THIS SITUATION, WHICH IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO MODIFY IN SPITE OF THE DESTRUCTION OF A HIGH NUMBER OF SURFACE UNITS THROUGH AIR ATTACKS, PUTS THE ENEMY IN UNSURPASSABLE CONDITIONS TO EXTEND THE OCCUPATION OF THE ISLANDS.



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CONCLUSIONS:

FROM THE ABOVE IT IS ASSESSED THAT:

1) WHEN THE ENEMY DECIDES TO OPERATE AGAIN AGAINST OUR POSITIONS, HE WILL FIND A DEFENCE LACKING IN MOBILITY AND WITH RELATIVELY LESS FIRE POWER AND TRAINING, WHICH IT IS CONSIDERED WILL PREVIOUSLY HAVE BEEN SOFTENED UP BY INTENSE NAVAL FIRE AND AIR SUPPORT.

PART VI OF VI PARTS

2) THE ENEMY MAINTAINS AN AIR SUPERIORITY WHICH IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO BREAK IN SPITE OF THE EFFORT MADE BY THE AIR FORCE. THE CAPABILITY TO CONTROL EQUIPMENT AND THE HIGH DENSITY OF ANTI-AIR WEAPONRY MAKE THE LOSSES SUFFERED IN THE ATTEMPTS MADE TO PROVIDE CLOSE SUPPORT FIRE UNACCEPTABLE.

3) THE ENEMY MAINTAINS ABSOLUTE SUPREMACY AT SEA, WITH ALL THE OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL CONSEQUENCES WHICH THIS IMPLIES, ((AND)) A MODIFICATION OF THIS SITUATION IS NOT ANTICIPATED BECAUSE OF THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF OUR OWN NAVAL RESOURCES. THIS MESSAGE IS TOP SECRET.

FOOTNOTES: ((I)) 'DESEQUILIBRANTES' IN TEXT.

((II)) 'ARMANDO' IN TEXT.