

TOP SECRET-UMBRA

Reference...D/3249/2304/14.....

23 April 1982

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UK EYES A

H4 J1 AJ27 K K2 M21 P S S1 S4 V2 Z GCOL

DR - DP to see on file

FALKLANDS : NOTES OF MEETING ON 22 APRIL 1982

Present: DR DP H4 J1 AJ27 K K2 M21 P S S1 S4 Z D1A

1. Current Intelligence:

(a) A report, apparently from the Argentine attache in Washington, was worrying K in that it revealed the British invasion plan. Z had authorised "action-on" for the SAS commander at the request of Northwood. Z also referred to a possible "leak" of information on the positions of UK ships as reported in the "Boston Globe". There was no Sigint involved and it was considered an internal MOD matter.

(b) The report of the use of Jumbo Jets was found in fact to refer to 707s and according to the news they had indeed detected the British Task Force.

(c) Naval signals had been intercepted with "action" addresses which implied that the recipients were at sea but as yet there was no indication of the AR battle plan or indeed their intentions.

2. Cover position:

K2 reported that the long haul communications were satisfactory but the short haul signals were still difficult. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The US were covering the Presidential communications in Buenos Aires. Limited military cover was possible at UKC100 and some intercept was being received from the Task Force. Some short haul signals were being received from "ENDURANCE". On the Falklands themselves K2 knew of no communications on S. Georgia but Port Stanley was connected with Argentina by both international links and as an outstation of a naval group. Naval and

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submarine broadcast nets were being heard by everyone. No known special links established for Galtieri's visit to Falklands (22/4) and there was no doubt that any comms of Costa Mendez (at present in Washington) would be covered by NSA. Intercept at Santiago was poor. K28 was liaising with S1 on UKC204 trials to take ARN. K2 reiterated her request for any short haul take anywhere. The possibility of Capetown, the Antarctic and Tristan da Cunha were considered. The US was at present considering possible use of its sites in Africa. The Maritime Nimrods were to be used to collect [REDACTED] only.

3. Northwood accept that GCHQ are tasking the shipborne intercept - the team used by K was "advisory tasking" - though obviously when they were in a tactical position no tasking would be possible.

4. S has the disposition of all the shipborne intercept teams.

5. The first direct signal had been received from "HERMES" this morning (22/4). DP said that he had been told that both a 2.4 and a 4.8 link were available from "HERMES"; a 9.6 link was a little more difficult but would be available at 2 weeks' notice. DP had the contact parts and GCHQ would be allowed use at the discretion of C-in-C Fleet.

6. DR said that both DMSI/DGI were still enquiring about the use of helicopters to extend the radar horizon. S was asked to find out answers (via Northwood if necessary) to the following questions:

- (a) whether it was technically feasible to fit receivers into a helicopter;
- (b) how can we get AR tactical signals beyond the horizon (ie by the use of balloons etc)

and feed the answers back to DGI (via Director).

7. Z reported that AFS was making further enquiries about the possibility of accommodation at Palmer Street.

8. FCO had asked for a daily summary of events on the Falklands crisis. As such documents already exist the attention of FCO would be drawn to them by signalling the DTGs of the appropriate documents.

Action: K2 with Z1

9. J28 had nothing on the new Soviet "spy" satellites. AJ27 would chase J28 for further information and a list of relevant satellites.

Action: AJ27

10. The Foxtrot class submarine was now thought to have joined the West African Station.

11. [REDACTED]

Action: V2/K

12. On the possible use of Soviet Elint satellites, V2 had spoken to J28 who considered that it would not be possible to either process it at GCHQ or expedite the processing at NSA as the processing was complex. J28 was to pursue the latter possibility.

Action: J28

13. The MOD complaints on Elint accuracy were based on firm collateral which had now been elicited from them and passed to [REDACTED].


14. H4 said that K should not read too much into H's inability to break long messages. The particular instance had been because of a "difficult" plain text and there was no specific move by AR to change their procedures in reaction to press reports etc.

15. S said that now was the time to be thinking about some form of semi-permanent signal facility for the Falklands and suggested the possibility of fitting one of the minesweeper/trawlers.

Action: S


16. [REDACTED]

17. Exploitation of [REDACTED]:



f. There was considerable discussion on the possibility of getting fairly large samples of [REDACTED] ciphony back to GCHQ for exploitation here.

g. Ascension: 3 Nimrods and men were to deploy to Ascension today (22/4). It was decided that the communications package should be shipped out to Ascension as soon as possible and installed but that the first NIMROD intercepts would be couriered back to M21C. The 4.8 kbs link from Ascension would terminate in GCHQ and H4 proposed to use an SSPU digitiser with the output being passed to Polestar. Again the possibility of strategic exploitation of [REDACTED] was considered.



i. DP will speak to W on the possible use of the Fleet wide-band communication that we have been offered.